The four-person constant-sum games (in (0, l)-normalization) can, as is well known, be represented by a unit cube 0 ^ v t ^ 1, where Vt = 1 -v({ί, 4}) . We consider here games on the "main diagonal/' v x = v 2 = v 3 = U. These are, of course, symmetric in {1, 2, 3}. We look for solutions which discriminate the remaining player, 4. The following theorems are given without proof (see [2] ): THEOREM 
Let v be an n-person game, and let V be a solution which discriminates the members of N -S, giving them the amounts ocj. Then the S-components of the elements of V form a solution to the game v 8>gy where
Let F* be a solution to v 8yq , and let V be obtained from F* by adjoining the components (a ό Thanks to these theorems, the question of whether a solution of v s , g expands to one of v, reduces to whether imputations outside of F, other than these satisfying (1) , are dominated by F.
From the above, we know that a discriminatory solution to a 4-person game must have the form of a solution to a 3-person game. Now, these have been catalogued for us (see, e.g., [4] ). For the games on the main diagonal, the 3-person games v 8tq where S = {1, 2, 3}, are symmetric, and there will be seven types of solution, types I through VII shown in Figures 1 through 7 respectively. Since the game v is constant-sum, we will always have v({l, 2, 3}) ^ q. Moreover, with only one player in N -S, we need only worry about imputations x with Xi > a A . If # 4 = a 4 , then either xe V, or xiV and so (x ly x 2 , x 3 )& F*. Hence there is ye V such that (y lf y 2 , y z ) dominates (x lf x 2 , x 3 ) in (v) and so y > x (in v). (0,0,(7,1-4) (0,0,0,1-tf) F (0,(7,0,1-
Note finally that we have a 4 -1 -q. We will use 1 -q throughout, rather than α 4 , 2* Description of the several types* We describe now the seven types of solution.
Type I (see Figure 1 ) consists of the three points A, B, C (the mid-points of the inner triangle formed by the lines x { + x ά = U) together with three "bargaining curves" AD, BE, and CF, arbitrary except for the proviso that, on any one of these curves, the shares of the two players who are receiving more than the third must increase or decrease simultaneously (see [4] ).
The points A, B, C have the components:
Type II (See Figure 2) consists of the straight line AB, plus three bargaining curves AD, BE, CF. The straight line is parallel to x z = 0, less than half-way up the inner triangle, whereas the point C is the intersection of the lines through A and B, parallel to x t = 0 and x 2 = 0, respectively. The bargaining curves are arbitrary, except for the monotonicity conditions described above. Now A, B, C are given by
where k is any number satisfying
Type III is very similar to type II, the sole difference lying in the fact that line AB is now the edge of the inner triangle, i.e.,
Type IV is quite similar to type II. The difference, here, lies in the fact that the lines through A and B, parallel to x 1 = 0 and * 2 = 0, intersect outside the triangle. Thus the point C disappears, as does, indeed the whole curve CF. We will have
Type V is quite similar to type IV (its relation to type IV is the same as that of III to II). The points A and B are:
Type VI is considerably different. It consists of the triangle ABC (see Figure 6 ) which is the core of the three-person game v, plus the three bargaining curves AD, BE, CF. The points A, B, C Lave coordinates
Finally, type VII is the only type of solution which does not contain a bargaining curve (see Figure 7) . It is the core of the threeperson game, the hexagon with vertices
<24)
A = (u,0,q-U,l-q) ,
3* Domination of imputations* We now treat the question of consistency. Since internal consistency is trivial, we need only worry about external consistency. In this section we look for conditions that an imputation be undominated by the set V. As discussed above,, we need only consider imputations with x 4 < 1 -q.
Suppose then, that x 4 < 1 -q. We wish to know whether there is some y e V with y > x. Now this domination can only be through a 2-person or 3-person coalition. It cannot be through {1, 2, 3}, as we know that, if y e V then y A > x 4f and so y λ + y 2 + y z < x ι + x 2 + # 3 It might be through a 2-person subcoalition of {1, 2, 3}, but if so, we can always add player 4 to this coalition, since the 3-person coalitions are all winning, and we have y 4 > x 4 . Thus domination may be assumed to be through a 2-or 3-person coalition which includes player 4.
Suppose, then, that x, with x 4 < 1 -q, is dominated by some y e V through a 2-person coalition, say {1,4}. This means
Clearly, condition (2) is satisfied by all y e V, as y 4 -1 -q > .τ 4 . This means, moreover, that (3) reduces to
Thus the question of whether x is dominated through {1,4} by some yeV reduces to whether there exists yeV satisfying (1) and (4). It becomes natural to look for that y e V which maximizes y lf subject to condition (4) . Then x will be dominated through {1,4} by this point, if and only if x ι < y t . If x x is greater than this constrained maximum of y lf then no y e V can dominate x through {1,4}. Looking at the several types of solution, we see that, in each type, there is some point with y ι = q -U. (This is point B for types I through V, point A for type VI, and point E for type VII.) We conclude that, for each type, a necessary and sufficient condition for x to be undominated by V through {1,4} is
Consider, next, domination through {2,4}. The situation here i& exactly the same, and the condition for nondomination is
We go on to domination through {3,4}. In this case, the symmetry of the situation is lost because there are two types (II and IV) with no point y satisfying y z = q -U. In type II, the critical point for {3,4} domination is C, with y 3 = q -2U + 2fc, while in type IV, there is no domination through {3,4}.
We consider, now, domination through the 3-person coalitions {i, j, 4}. We need worry about this domination only in case x is undominated through {ΐ, 4} and {j, 4}.
Take, for example, the coalition {1, 2, 4}. We know y > x through {1, 2, 4} if and only if
Condition (7) will hold automatically. Conditions (5) and (6) must hold simultaneously. But, if x x < q -U or x 2 < q -U, x will be dominated by {1,4} and {2,4}. As we are not worried about such x, we may assume x { ^ q -U for i -1, 2. In this context, conditions (5) and (6) imply that y { > q -U for i = 1, 2. Thus we must look for points which maximize y x and y 2 , subject to the constraint that both be greater than q -U. Now, it happens that, for types I, II, III, and VI, point F maximizes both y L and y 2 , subject to y ι > q -U, y 2 > q -U. We conclude that, for these four types, the necessary and sufficient condition for nondomination through {1, 2, 4}, assuming x is not dominated through {1,4} or {2,4}, is:
For type IV and V solutions, the situation is slightly different. Here, there is no point which maximizes both y ι and y 2 ; rather we find that the line segment AB maximizes the sum y γ + y 2 ; it satisfies Vi + 2/2 = Q ~ k for type IV; y t + y 2 = U for type V. What is more, the line AB will contain all points which satisfy this equation as well as 2/< ;> q -U for i = 1, 2. Thus, if x 1 + x 2 < q -k, with x 1^ q -U, x 2 ^ q -U, we can find some y on AB with y γ > x ly y 2 > x 2 . For type IV, the necessary and sufficient condition for nondomination through {1, 2, 4} (assuming nondomination through {1,4} and {2,4}) is thus Xί + x 2 q -k while, for type V, it is Xl + %2 ^ U For type VII, the situation is quite simple: there is no y e V with Vi> q -U, ί -1, 2. Thus we need not worry about domination through {1, 2, 4}.
We go now to domination through {1, 3, 4}. For types I, VI, and VII, symmetry tells us that the results are similar to those for {l r 2, 4}. The critical point (for I and VI) is D.
For type II, lack of symmetry complicates the situation slightly, but we find that D is once again critical, as it maximizes y λ , and y zr subject to y ι > q -U, y 3 > q -2U + 2k. This analysis is valid, with minor variations, for types III, IV, and V as well. Thus, for types I through VI, the condition
is both necessary and sufficient for {1, 3, 4} nondomination, assuming no domination through {1,4} or {3,4}. For type VII, such domination is unimportant.
For {2, 3, 4} domination, symmetry makes the analysis exactly similar to that for {1, 3, 4}.
We conclude this section by giving a list of conditions for nondomination of x. 4* External stability* We consider now the question of whether a set F, of one of the types described, is really a solution. The condition for this is quite simply expressed. There must be no x which satisfies all of the conditions in the table above. More precisely, the nondomination conditions must be inconsistent with the conditions x t ^ 0, Σ #< = l Consider, thus, types I, III, and VI. The nondomination condi-tions consist of three single conditions and three pairs of alternatives. This means that there are eight sets of six conditions each. Each of these eight sets is sufficient for nondomination, while one is necessary. If we choose the first condition from each pair of alternatives, we have (1) x^q-U,
Xi^d 19
Now, jfΊ and d x are both greater than q -U, as is e 2 . Thus the conditions (l)-(6) reduce to four.
We introduce the notation In a similar manner, each of the seven other sets of conditions will reduce to three conditions, which will be inconsistent with the natural constraints if a certain strict inequality holds. We have then: THEOREM 3. A necessary and sufficient condition for a set V, of types I, III, or VI, with q < 1, to be a solution, is that
g ι +e t + q-ϋ>l, For type IV, the situation is somewhat different. There are two pairs of alternatives, and hence four possibilities. The first possibility is (23) x^q-U,
Now, d t^ q ~ U and e 2^ q -U. Moreover, we know that g -2U + 2& < 0, as otherwise the solution would be of type II (i.e., the point C would be an imputation). But this means that d ί + e 2 ^ q2k, and as k > 0, ^ + β 2 :> g -k. The five conditions (23)-(27) thus reduce to two: 
{36)
q-U>lβ.
5* Existence of solutions* We have, in §4, given conditions for a set V, of the several types discussed, to be a solution. We now consider the more difficult problem of deciding the values of U and q for which such solutions exist. This will mean determining whether the conditions (4.7)-(4.14), (4.15)-(4.22), (4.28)-(4.31), (4.32)-(4.35), or (4.36) will be consistent with the remaining constraints of the problems.
We note first of all that, for the first six types of solution, a necessary condition is (1) 2q -U > 1 .
In effect, this is due to the fact that, in any case,
Now, looking at constraints (4.7)-(4.14) we see that (5.1) is implied, whatever g lf g 2 , and g 3 may be. Thus, if we have g λ = d lf g 2 f 2 i Qz = #3, we need only to add (4.7), (4.10) and (4.11), obtaining Qq -3Z7 > 3. If, on the other hand, we should have g λ = d ly g 2 = e 2 , g 3 -c£ 3 , we would add (4.8), (4.9), (4.11) and (4.12) to obtain 8q -W > 4. This disposes of types I, III, and VI, for all other cases reduce to one of these, by symmetry.
For type II, the same holds if we substitute the inequality k < £7/2 in (4.15) and (4.16). For type IV, addition of (4.29) and (4.30) gives Aq -2U > 2. Finally, for type V, addition of (4.33) and (4.34) gives the same result.
Condition (5.1) is thus necessary for types I through VI. We look, however, for necessary and sufficient conditions. Consider type I. We know that this can only exist if
In addition to constraints (5.2), the points D, E, F must satisfy
and it is clear that
will satisfy all the constraints (4.7)-(4.15), (5.2) and (5.4) whenever q ^ U. But we must have q Ξ> U if (5.1) holds. Thus THEOREM 8. A game on the main diagonal will have a solution to type I, with q < 1, if and only if
For such U, it will have such a solution for q satisfying
Proof. Condition (6) has been proved. Moreover, it is easy to see that (5) is necessary and sufficient for (6) to be feasible.
Consider next type II. We know that (3) must hold, as well as. (2.10)-(2.11). Now, D, E, F must satisfy (2) , and also (7) d lf e 2 , fuft^U-k
and we see that, if we choose k -U/2 -ε (where ε is less than. 2Z7 -q -1) the vector
will satisfy constraints (4.15)- (4.22) , (2), (7) and (8) whenever (1) and (3) hold. Thus THEOREM 9. A game on the main diagonal will have a solution°f type II, with q < 1, if and only if
For such U, it will have such a solution if q satisfies
(10) U+l<2q^3U.
Proof. Same as for Theorem 8. We go on to type III. We know, first of all, that condition (3) is necessary. Moreover, we must have 3g -4ί7^ 0, as otherwise C will be outside the simplex of imputations, giving rise to a type V solution. Thus will satisfy all the constraints whenever (1) and (11) For such U it will have such a solution for q satisfying
Consider next type IV. Once again, we know that we must have condition (3) . However, k must satisfy conditions (2.17)-(2.18), which together imply the much stronger constraint:
Finally, D and E must satisfy (2), and also
Suppose now U > 4g/5. Then the vector
will satisfy constraints (4.28)-(4.31), as well as (2), (18) is easily seen to satisfy the constraints, whenever (20) We go on to type V. As for type IV, (17) must hold. The points D and E must satisfy (2) , and also (24) d» e 2 ^ 2U -q
It is clear that the vector
will satisfy all the constraints (4.7)-(4.14), (2), (24) and (25), whenever (1) and (17) 3/5 < U < 1 .
It will have such solutions for q satisfying
We go on to type VI. We know these solutions can exist only if q/2 ^ U ^ 2qβ. The constraints on D, E, F here are (2) It is not difficult to see that the vector
ill satisfy constraints (4.7)-(4.14), (2) and (28) whenever (1) 
For such U, solutions will exist for q satisfying
6* Conclusion* This terminates, more or less, the study of discriminatory solutions. We find, however, that many assumptions have been made throughout. One is that q < 1, the other, that U < q. We clear this up by pointing out that, for U ^ g, there can be solutions, if any, only of types I, IV, and V. If of type I, the solution would consist only of the three points:
For g < 1, it is clear that (1/2, 1/2, 0, 0) is undominated by these. In DISCRIMINATORY SOLUTIONS ON THE MAIN DIAGONAL 479 effect, such domination could only be through {3,4} by A or B. But and so there is no domination.
As for a solution of types IV or V, this would consist only of the line AB, joining. and A = (q -k, 0, fe, 1 -q) = (0,q-k,k,l-q) and again ((1 -&)/2, (1 -fc)/2, Λ, 0) is undominated as, for i = 1, 2, 3, we have 1 -q :> v({ΐ, 4}). We consider finally the case of q = 1. In this case, the problem has been solved (see, e.g., [4] ). We will have solutions of the several types for: The Supporting Institutions listed above contribute to the cost of publication of this Journal, but they are not owners or publishers and have no responsibility for its content or policies.
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